Laboratory markets are conducted to evaluate the effects of consumer search costs on market performance. The primary research goal is to assess the behavioral relevance of Diamond's (1971) paradoxical conclusion that the injection of a small consumer search cost alters the equilibrium price prediction from competitive to monopoly levels. Although monopoly prices are not consistently observed, we find that search costs do tend to raise prices. Additional experimentation indicates that below-monopoly prices are not explained by sellers' price-posting reputations, but that prices increase as search costs are raised. We conjecture that the Diamond prediction fails because sellers neither immediately appreciate, nor readily learn the necessary recursive "price-plus-search-cost" reasoning.
Introduction
One of the seminal developments leading to the information economics revolution in the 1970's and 1980's was Diamond's (1971) theoretical result that, in the absence of publicly posted price information, the existence even a small search cost could lead to monopoly pricing. The intuition is straightforward: No buyer with one price quote would want to search for a second, unless the new quote is expected to be lower by at least the amount of the search cost. Thus each seller has an incentive to price slightly above any common price, and the noncooperative equilibrium in a single-stage game yields a monopoly price. This result is viewed as a paradox, since a "small" search cost produces high prices, but a zero search cost would produce the usual Bertrand incentives that drive prices to competitive levels, in the absence of capacity constraints * Virginia Commonwealth University and University of Virginia, respectively. This research was supported by grants from the University of Virginia Bankard fund and the National Science Foundation (grants SES 9012694 and SES 9012691). and other imperfections. 1 Recent theoretical work has focused on finding a "resolution" to the paradox. Stahl (1989) , for example, generates a smooth transition between competitive and monopoly outcomes as the fraction of consumers with zero search costs increases from 0 to 1. Interestingly, Stahl finds that, holding the number of informed buyers constant, increasing the number of sellers makes pricing more monopolistic. Bagwell and Ramey (1992) propose an alternative resolution that applies to an infinitely repeated market game where sellers who raise prices can develop a reputation that can affect sales in future periods. Bagwell and Ramey show that buyers can obtain lower equilibrium prices by following a "loyalty-boycott" search rule, where low-pricing sellers are rewarded with repeated purchases, and high-pricing sellers are punished with switching. The price predictions vary continuously between monopoly and competitive levels, depending on the size of the consumer search cost.
The policy relevance of the Diamond paradox depends on whether there are realistic market environments in which the provision of public price information will actually lower prices and improve efficiency.
2 Due to the difficulty of controlling and measuring information flows in natural markets, the laboratory represents an ideal place to evaluate the Diamond paradox and proposed resolutions. The only experimental analysis of the Diamond paradox of which we are aware is reported by Grether, Schwartz and Wilde (1988) , who observed monopoly pricing in 3 of 4 predicted cases. Their results are suggestive, but not definitive, for reasons discussed below.
In particular, all four cases involved the same group of subjects "to the extent possible" (p. 328).
This paper reports an experiment consisting of twelve market sessions designed to assess the effects of public price information. The markets are conducted as normal posted-offer 1 Much subsequent theoretical research focused on the sensitivity of this paradox to alterations in the informationtransmission technology. The resulting models identify conditions under which monopoly, competitive and heterogenous prices are predicted, depending on how information is disseminated. See, e.g., Butters (1977) , Salop and Stiglitz (1977) , and Wilde and Schwartz (1979) .
2 Both intuition and the Diamond result would suggest that if goods are sold on a posted-price basis, then public information about those prices should improve performance. But it should not be assumed that the effect of public information is independent of other institutional aspects of the market. For example, Hong and Plott (1982) show that market performance is impaired, not improved, by the transition from unstructured bilateral negotiation (with no public price information) to posted prices (with public price information). In contrast, the Diamond paradox pertains to a comparison between costly and public price information, within a common institutional framework in which prices are posted on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
2 markets, except that buyers must pay a small cost each time they approach a different seller. In baseline "Posted-Offer" treatments, prices are publicly displayed to buyers, while in "Search" treatments, prices are not publicly displayed. In brief, we found that prices approach competitive levels under the Posted-Offer treatment, and prices are significantly higher under the Search treatment. Nevertheless, the Diamond prediction of monopoly pricing under Search is not observed, although increases in search costs do raise prices. These results indicate that economists should take a more careful look at attempts to resolve the Diamond paradox by introducing other factors that may impede monopoly pricing in markets with consumer search.
The paper is organized as follows. Our two primary treatments are outlined in section 2, and results are presented in section 3. The failure to observe the Diamond monopoly price prediction motivated additional research on the effects of reputations and search costs, which is presented in section 4. The final section contains a conclusion.
Experiment Design and Procedures
The first six sessions to be discussed involved the Posted-Offer and Search treatments it is independent of the number of units purchased.
3 3 Thus we compare performance across price-publicity conditions, holding search costs constant. This differs from the usual theoretical discussion, which focuses on the effects of injecting costly search into an environment where prices are not public. We chose not to evaluate performance in a no-search cost/private-information baseline environment largely It is worth emphasizing the way in which our Search treatment differs from the Grether, Schwartz, and Wilde (1988) design. In their Search ("Monopoly") treatment, buyers were shown the complete list of posted prices at the beginning of each period, without seller identifications.
A buyer could avoid a search cost by making a purchase (if profitable) from one seller randomly selected by the experimenter. Alternatively, the buyer could pay a cost (10 cents) to obtain a sample of 2 or more randomly selected sellers, so that a purchase could be made at the lower price. We decided not to reveal any prices to buyers unless they paid a search cost in a sequential search setup. We were motivated in part by Stahl's (1989, p . 700) argument against "... the dubious assumption that consumers can 'see' deviations by firms before they actually search." 4 In any event, our design is unquestionably as legitimate as the Grether, Schwartz and
Wilde design, and is perhaps more appealing from the perspective of realism.
Each session consisted of 3 buyers (B1-B3) and 3 sellers (S1-S3), with values and costs indicated by the trader identification for each unit on the market demand and supply curves shown on the left side of figure 1. The buyers are symmetric, each with units valued 70 and 30 cents above the competitive prediction, P e , which is normalized to zero. Similarly, sellers faced identical costs, with a single unit at a marginal cost 30 cents below P e , and three additional units with costs at P e . The large excess supply of 6 units at supracompetitive prices makes the market very competitive; one seller will be left out of the market if sellers offer at least 2 units.
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In particular, the design violates the standard assumption that sellers produce at constant marginal cost, and that buyers have a constant and uniform reservation value. The high-value and low-cost for procedural reasons: It takes each buyer several minutes to elicit costless price quotes from sellers each period. Not only would this treatment make it difficult examine a pair of treatments in a 2-hour session, but any observed differences in performance from that observed in a standard posted-offer market could be attributable to (uncontrolled) time-costs of shopping.
This market design does not exactly implement any specific search model in the literature. steps were added to give the competitive and monopoly predictions a realistic chance of being observed, since stable outcomes in which one side of the market earns nothing are rarely observed. The design is anchored on a minimum earnings of 25 cents per trader per period at each of these outcomes. For this reason, the cost step for the first unit is 25 cents below P e .
Similarly, the placement of buyer's first unit value at 40 cents above the monopoly price, P m , guarantees each buyer a minimum earning of 25 cents at the monopoly outcome, after subtracting out the 15 cent shopping cost.
Subjects were University of Virginia students who were recruited from economics classes.
Buyer and seller roles were determined by random draws. Then subjects were seated at visually 5 isolated personal computers. Instructions were presented on the displays as an experimenter read aloud from a monitor display. 6 After the initial 20-period treatment, supplemental instructions were read for the final 20-period sequence. The final period was not announced for either sequence.
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Subjects were paid $6.00 for showing up, in addition to earnings from trading.
Earnings averaged $24.10 per subject, and ranged from $12.50 to $35.25. Payments were made in private immediately after the session. Two of the six sessions were conducted with subjects who had previously participated in a laboratory posted-offer market session (but in a different design), while participants in the remaining four sessions had no previous experience in an economics laboratory experiment.
The configuration of treatments by session is summarized by the 3-part identifiers in column (1) of table 1. Each identifier consists of a two-letter prefix ('SP' or 'PS') to indicate whether the search or posted-offer sequence came first, followed by a number indicating the order in sequence, and an 'x' if the session used experienced participants. Thus, for example session PS3x in the third row to table 1 refers to the third session in the posted-offer/search sequence with experienced participants. sequence of each session than in the corresponding posted-offer sequence. This result is also prices are the exception rather than the rule. Consider, for example, the mean price deviations P-P e for these 6 sessions, listed in column (1) The heterogeneity of outcomes both within and across treatments indicates that factors other than the presence of public price information affect pricing behavior. Some of these factors may be largely procedural. An order-of-treatment effect is suggested by the mean price information in table 1. Average deviations are higher in sequences where the search sequence may be an experience effect, since the lowest two price deviations were generated in sessions where participants were inexperienced.
Results

Mean
The variability of performance within treatments suggests that differences in participant behavior may be important. Sellers, for example, may vary substantially in their appreciation of the recursive, "price-plus-shopping-cost" reasoning that generates Diamond's monopoly pricing prediction. Buyers, on the other hand, may be able to force prices down by "punishing" sellers.
As suggested by Bagwell and Ramey, buyers may either refuse to purchase if a posted price is unacceptably high, or may purchase, but shop elsewhere in other periods.
There is at least anecdotal evidence that buyers employed punishment behavior of this sort. Consider for example, the sequence of contracts for the search sequence of session PS3x is illustrated between the left-most pair of vertical bars in figure 2. In this period, sellers S1 and S2 posted prices 5 cents below P m , and S3 posted a price 20 cents above P m . Sellers S1 and S2 subsequently sold 2 units each, while S3 sold a single unit.
In sequence PS3x, seller S2 posted prices well above P m in periods 2 to 5, and posted prices at P m in periods 7 and 10. Although this seller occasionally made sales at high prices (e.g,.
in periods 2, 3 and 7), the buyers became wary of these high postings, and failed to approach this seller in periods 10 through 17, this despite successive price decreases in periods 11, 14 and 17 (where price was lowered to the cost of the low cost unit). Although punishment was not immediate in this session, seller S2 clearly paid for high price postings in the early periods of the session.
Other instances of punishment were observed in the other sessions, albeit less dramatic.
It is difficult to develop a reasonable statistic for switching away in response to "high" prices, 10 Using the Mann-Whitney test, the null hypothesis of no order-of-sequence effect can be rejected at only an 80% confidence level. Intuitively, there are ( 6 3 )=20 possible ways that average price deviations for the 3 SP and the 3 PS sessions could be ranked, and there are 4 outcomes which generate a smaller sum of ranks than that observed. since, given shopping costs, a "high" price in a given period is a subjective assessment on the Nevertheless the effects of reputation may be evaluated by examining behavior in additional laboratory sessions where reputations are controlled. A primary goal of the research described in the next section, is to isolate the effects of sellers' reputations.
Search Costs and Reputations
Although the absence of price information tends to raise prices in an environment where shopping is costly, prices are not raised to monopoly levels as implied by the Diamond paradox.
This raises the question of whether there is a reasonable baseline condition in which the absence of public price information clearly generates monopoly prices. Toward identifying such a baseline, we conducted two additional 3-session treatments. In each case, we attempted to control for reputations by disguising seller identities. To examine the comparative-statics effects of a search cost increase, the second treatment differs from the first in that shopping costs are doubled. These sessions are summarized by the identifiers listed in columns (1) and (3) of table 2. These identifiers roughly follow the labeling convention in table 1: The two-letter "SN" prefix indicates that price information was not publicly displayed (e.g. 'search'), and that sellers reputations were disguised ('no reputations'). This prefix is followed by an L (search cost = 15 cents) or H (search cost = 30 cents), a number in sequence, and an 'x' if experienced participants were used. 
Controlling for Reputations:
The most important difference between the Search treatment described in the previous section and the SNL treatment listed in columns (1) and (2) of table 2 is that seller identities were disguised so that buyers would be unable to determine which sellers posted which prices. Higher prices in this treatment than in the preceding treatments would indicate that reputation effects in fact tend to lower prices.
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To disguise seller identities, the following procedures were used. At the beginning of the session, sellers were visually isolated from the buyers and were given a colored marble "identifier." Prior to each period a monitor drew the marbles in sequence from the urn and 11 Although this treatment may be expected to shed some light on the importance of seller reputations on pricing outcomes, it should not be interpreted as a test of the Bagwell-Ramey model. An exact implementation of the BagwellRamey model would require too many design alterations to allow comparison of results with our existing sessions (in particular, sessions must be indefinitely repeated). assigned the role of seller S1 to the first marble drawn, seller S2 to the second marble, and S3 to the third marble. The sellers then took their seats and posted prices. Further, to prevent sellers from divulging their identity via very rapid or very slow price postings, the monitor made the final price confirmation for each seller, once all sellers had finished posting prices. In this way, the posting sequence was terminated in a pre-announced, anonymity-preserving fashion.
In an effort to give monopoly price outcomes a reasonable chance, we made two additional procedural changes: First, given the likelihood of sequencing effects, we did not precede any of the sessions with a posted-offer sequence.
12 Second, we decided to let sellers see each other's price postings. While the relevant theory is silent on the matter of the amount of price information available to sellers, we decided to give this information to sellers, in an effort to facilitate learning of the recursive "price-plus-shopping-cost" reasoning that goes into generating Diamond results. In all other respects procedures were identical to our initial search treatments: Shopping costs were 15 cents per approach, each sequence consisted of 20 periods, and the experience profile consisted of two sessions with inexperienced participants, and a single experienced session.
As in the preceding section, results are obvious, and follow almost without comment from the mean contract price sequences shown in the left panel of figure 3 (formatted as figure 1).
As indicated by the bolded overall mean contract price path lying roughly halfway between P m and P e , mean prices are no higher when reputations are disguised. In fact, comparing price data in sessions SNL1-3x and SP1-3x, one can see that mean prices were actually 5 cents lower on average in the "no-reputation" sessions than in the reputation sessions. Although results are too mixed to allow us to make a reasonable statistical claim that prices are actually higher when seller identities are not hidden, the results provide absolutely no support for the hypothesis that disguising information tends to raise prices. This motivates our third observation:
Conclusion 3: Seller reputations do not lower prices. Prices are no closer to the monopoly
12 Actually, we decided to focus on the effects of reputation in the initial session after observing almost perfectly competitive prices in the "search" sequence of a "no-reputation" pilot session where the search sequence followed a posted-offer sequence. The reported sequences were followed with a variety of pilot treatments, none of which merit comment here.
prediction when seller identities are disguised than when prices are publicly displayed.
The failure to observe monopoly price outcomes, even when seller identities are hidden and when sellers can see the prices posted by others, suggests that sellers fail to appreciate the recursive "price-plus-search-cost" reasoning underlying the Diamond prediction. Nevertheless, search costs provide sellers with some pricing discretion, much in the manner of switching costs or other entry impediments. To the extent this is true,: The magnitude of the impediment determines the extent of sellers' price discretion. As a final treatment, we examine this prediction by increasing search costs.
Search Costs, Comparative Statics Effects:
Our final treatment consists of 3 sessions conducted as in the no-reputation treatment, except that switching costs were increased to 30 cents. With minor exceptions, other procedures were exactly as described in the reputation control sessions.
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Results of these "SNH" sessions are summarized in the right panel of figure 3 , and in 13 There were two exceptions. First, our experience profile consisted entirely of experienced participants. Second, buyer earnings were supplemented with a private, one-time $5 payment in the middle of each session. We were prompted to provide this supplement while observing very low buyer earnings in session SNH1x, and which threatened to diminish buyer interest. 13 column (4) of table 2. A comparison of the left and right panels of figure 3 indicates that increases in search costs raise prices. In the high-search-cost sessions, the mean price deviation is 26 cents above P e , twice the 13 cent deviation from P e observed in the low search cost sessions. Further, the mean price in each SNH session is higher than the highest price in the SNL treatment. The uniformity of results allows rejection of the null hypothesis that increasing search costs does not affect prices at a 95% confidence level using the nonparametric MannWhitney test.
14 This leads to our fourth, and final conclusion.
Conclusion 4:
Other things constant, increases in search costs tend to increase prices.
Discussion
This paper has examined the results of 12 market sessions designed to evaluate the behavioral robustness of the Diamond prediction. The two primary lessons of this research are that (1) the absence of public price information raises prices when shopping is costly, but that (2) the monopoly prices implied by the "Diamond paradox" are not generally observed. Efforts to find a baseline treatment where monopoly price outcomes yielded two additional conclusions:
(3) Controlling for seller identities is not sufficient to generate monopoly prices, and (4) increases in the search costs will raise prices.
In an important sense, the results of our initial sessions are consistent with the intuition motivating Bagwell and Ramey's efforts to resolve the Diamond paradox. The implied thrust of their work is that the "Diamond Paradox" is too extreme, and that in richer contexts nonmonopoly prices will be observed. But equally important, results of our latter session are also inconsistent with the reasoning underlying Bagwell and Ramey's theoretical modifications. We observe non-monopoly prices, even when reputations cannot form. What then causes belowmonopoly prices? We conjecture that, as a behavioral matter, the Diamond result breaks down because sellers neither immediately appreciate nor do they readily learn the recursive "price-plusshopping-cost" reasoning necessary to generate the monopoly outcome. Rather, it appears that 14 Intuitively, of the ( 6 3 )=20 possible ways that average price deviations for the 3 SP and the 3 PS sessions could be ranked, the most extreme was observed (all SNH session above all SNL session). Under the null hypothesis of no treatment effect, this would occur 1 time out of 20. 14 search costs impede market performance much in the same way as other barriers to entry: Search costs make it difficult to buyers to leave a seller. Thus, the higher the search cost, the more market power sellers possess.
Our future research in this area will proceed in two directions. The first involves examining just where and how the Diamond prediction breaks down. It is possible that there are some contexts in which sellers do come to recognize the recursive reasoning necessary to generate monopoly outcomes. Obvious steps in this direction are to evaluate the differences between our treatments and the Grether, Schwartz and Wilde design (where monopoly prices were observed). Possible alterations include increasing the number of buyers and sellers, decreasing the capacity of buyers, and perhaps prohibiting seller stock-outs in a period.
The second direction for future research involves evaluation of predictions in the switching cost literature. Costs incurred when a buyer changes sellers may generate price outcomes consistent with those observed here, even when postings are public.
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15 Klemperer (1992) provides a nice summary of issues in the switching cost literature.
